Hussain Haqqani’s recent article in The Washington Post kicked up a mini political storm in Pakistan’s media and political circles. The Pakistan Peoples Party and other groupings got into a combative posture and demanded the setting up of a parliamentary committee to investigate the matter and ugly memories of Memogate and other national skeletons became the subject of serious discourse. Every major party wanted to score points and had something to say. Of course, it is a different matter that it will not be long before the matter will only be a part of the memory lane. And apart from bringing Hussian Haqqani into limelight, especially when many may have forgotten him, it reflected a fundamental weakness in Pakistan’s power structure and democratic consolidation.
Haqqani claims the increase in the US assistance package demanded facilitating visas to US personnel. Apparently, our authorities were ignorant that the real purpose of expanding American presence was to track Osama bin Laden. The CIA operatives did eventually succeed in tracking him without involving our government.
What the whole episode about giving generous access to American personnel does reflect is that in Pakistan major national decisions are taken in a vacuum and are highly personalised! There is a reason for it, because contrary to normal democratic norms our political leaders are in the habit of taking decisions at a personal rather than in an institutionalised manner. Moreover, our military establishment influences major decisions relating to security and foreign policy. In this case, the US deliberately avoided involving Pakistan Army or civilian leadership. Americans never fully trusted our army and intelligence in the hunt for Osama as they thought their efforts could get compromised. Whereas the PPP leadership was keen to remain close to the US to balance its internal weakness in dealing with the military. Moreover, substantive financial assistance that had reached US$7 billion was an additional attraction. The embassy was liberal in issuing visas to US personnel, many of whom were CIA operatives tasked to hunt Osama. They had apparently disguised themselves both to stay away from the watchful eye of our intelligence agencies and also thought this posture would facilitate in their hunt for him. Despite the fact that there was an international obligation to assist in the hunt for Osama, Pakistan was not that pushed. Paradoxically, in Pakistan’s security priorities he did not figure that high. For this indifference, Pakistan has paid a heavy price in terms of international reputation and its negative domestic fallout.
We should be genuinely interested in drawing some serious lessons from the fiasco that Osama lived right under our nose for several years and we failed to discover him. Regrettably, it was the Americans, through a clandestine activity, who discovered his whereabouts and assassinated him.
We also need to examine the deeper problem of strengthening our flawed, undemocratic decision-making structures. Placing blame on Hussain Haqqani and Afridi may be touching only the surface. This is not to deny that their role is questionable. However, given the indifference towards institutionalised decision-making by our rulers it is hardly surprising that policy and decision-making of national import remain personalised and disjointed. It is this very weakness that prevents our state from conducting a true national strategy that results in facing these unpleasant problems frequently.
Until there remains absence of institutional decision-making and we continue to have lack of intellectual content we will always face a similar crisis. As our brief history reminds us that there were much larger challenges Pakistan had to face due to this adhoc policymaking. Our robust and willing participation in the Afghan jihad and impromptu acceptance of playing a pivotal role after the iconic events of 9/11, without weighing its full consequences, are other examples of this faulty decision-making. The Kargil adventure nearly pushed us into a war with India although by then both were supposedly nuclear states.
One can enumerate many instances where we have faulted in policy formulation and rationalised these blunders by scapegoating the military or civilian leadership for it. But what is unfortunate is that even our civilian leaders seldom adhere to democratic norms of decision-making. This gives further leverage to the military to influence decision-making. Such shortcomings could be largely offset if the government would resort to involving both parliament and cabinet in formulation and oversight of major national policies, as is the norm with major democratic countries.
In Pakistan, the overwhelming centrality of security as the primary driver of international interest has given enormous leverage and importance to the military. This phenomenon got a huge boost during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and has continued to date. We are repeatedly reminded that Washington looks at Islamabad through Afghan or Indian lens. The lopsided view of Pakistan, in which security remains the prime interest for the US and certain powers, has magnified its political problems. Foreign powers in the past have exploited this weakness and have even been circumventing the civilian leadership and directly communicating with the army.
Sadly, despite the enormous sacrifices that the army has made in its fight against terror and securing our borders, it remains under criticism by the US, India, Afghanistan and other foreign countries. Because they focus on the army’s perceived tolerance and relationship with the Haqqani network, Quetta Shura and Jaish-e-Mohammad. This has given India a pretext to use Afghan territory for using TTP and other dissident elements against us. In sharp contrast, there is not a word of disapproval that one hears from the US government or Congress about India’s policies towards Pakistan or its brutal suppression of the Kashmir resistance movement. On the contrary, there are powerful voices in Congress that are initiating legislation to penalise Pakistan. The reason for this biased approach is obvious. The US considers India a strategic partner and for them the TTP and other anti-Pakistan groups based in, and operating from, Afghanistan are not a target.
We can only come out of this vicious cycle through a major reappraisal of our foreign and domestic policies.
Published in The Express Tribune, March 22nd, 2017.
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Great article, finally Pakistan has produced a General that thinks and talks sense.
“…contrary to normal democratic norms our political leaders are in the habit of taking decisions at a personal rather than in an institutionalised manner.-”
“…what is unfortunate is that even our civilian leaders seldom adhere to democratic norms of decision-making. This gives further leverage to the military to influence decision-making.-”
The general sees the result but doesn’t perceive what may be key causes: the laws regarding elected politicians in Pakistan, for which they can be disqualified from being elected or, if elected, removed from parliament. Among these rules are:.
1) elected politicians in Pakistan are legally answerable to their party chiefs, who themselves must not be elected officials.
2) parties may not “propagate any opinion, or act in a manner prejudicial to the fundamental principles enshrined in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan ”
3) a politician can be removed if “propagating any opinion, or acting in any manner, prejudicial to the Ideology of Pakistan, or the sovereignty, integrity or security of Pakistan, or morality, or the maintenance of public order, or the integrity or independence of the judiciary of Pakistan, or which defames or brings into ridicule the judiciary or the Armed Forces of Pakistan.”
These rules establish that an elected politician doesn’t represent his constituents who elected him to office but his party leader – that makes Pakistan an elective oligarchy rather than a representative democracy. Furthermore, the rules put severe limits on politicians’ freedom to engage in inter-party discussions, debate substantive issues like treason and the nature of Pakistan, criticize the government, or remove criminal officials from office. What safe path to decision-making remains other than from the top down and with almost no debate?
I will not go too deeply into the OBL incident at Abbottabad , because like everybody else I have not been acquainted with the facts, and no evidence has been presented. All we have been told is that US helicopters arrived at a compound at night, supposedly without permission in 2011, shots were reported, and OBL was dumped in the Indian Ocean. However, it is reassuring to note that people such as Mr. Haqqani are still interested, enough to try and scrutinize the matter at various levels.
You write nice English but I doubt whether even some of your countrymen can read it, understang what you are trying to say is beyond your policymakers. btw, were you as candid when in service or you opened up after retirement and receiving the ‘corner plot’ ?
@Rahul: Many of them do! But only after they retire.
Just like the culture of personalised and whimsical decision making by political leaders, same is true of our military leadership’s decision making. Obviously, the services have no choice but to follow without any meaningful dissent or challenge.
It is still possible to challenge and change policies of political leadership, but impossible to do it with the military, unfortunately.
It is time that we get rid of any traces of alliances with the forces of darkness, the fundamentalists.
“We should be genuinely interested in drawing some serious lessons from the fiasco that Osama lived right under our nose for several years and we failed to discover him. Regrettably, it was the Americans, through a clandestine activity, who discovered his whereabouts and assassinated him.”
Any lessons learnt from the fact that Mullah Omar died in Karachi and Pakistan chose to hide this fact from Americans after claiming for years that he never lived in Pakistan?
Any lessons learnt from the fact that when Mullah Mansoor was droned, he was traveling with the Pakistani passport and had been living in Pakistan for 15 years?
@numbersnumbers:
Dear numbers, You appear to be agreeing with what I presented, but missing the main point.. There is no legal evidence as to the demise of OBL at Abbottabad, and I am not aware that Pakistan has made an official statement on the matter. A legal Pakistan or US autopsy would have resolved the issue beyond doubt. After all, the US appears to have hangups over OBL. Why not provide normal evidence?